• Han Ye (叶晗)

    Boston University

    Ph.D. Candidate in Economics 

    I am a PhD candidate in Economics at Boston University. My fields of concentration are public policy, labor economics and applied microeconomics.


    Currently, I focus on researching labor market behaviors of older workers in response to retirement policy reforms, in the context of Germany. My research covers topics on: effects of pension subsidies on retirement timing, older workers' labor supply responses to unemployment insurance extensions, and employment beyond retirement.


    I have also worked on a project on incentive-based adaptive regulation in healthcare financing in developing countries, commissioned by the Center for Global Development (CGD), funded by the Gates Foundation. I am also interested in research related to displaced workers' labor outcomes, gender pension gap and other social programs.


    Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Boston University, May 2018 (expected)

    - Research Fields: Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics, Public Policy

    M.A. Economics, Boston University, 2012
    B.A. Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 2007


    Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

    Dissertation Fellowship, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, 2017

    Summer Research Grant, Boston University, Summer 2014

    Complete CV for download


  • More things she is working on...

    Research projects

    The Effect of Pension Subsidies on Retirement Decisions: Evidence from a Regression Kink Design

    Abstract: The problem of poverty in old age requires increasing attention especially in times of declining pension levels due to aging population. Using administrative pension insurance records from Germany, this paper studies the impact of a pension subsidy program for low pay workers, implemented in 1992, on retirement decisions. The kinked schedule of this subsidy policy allows us to identify the causal effect. Empirically, I use a Regression Kink Design to estimate the local average treatment effect of the subsidies on retirement timing. The estimation suggests that a 10 percent increase of pension benefit induces workers to retire earlier by about 6 months through wealth effect. However, no effects are found on age of exiting regular employment. Additionally, transitional channels from last employment to retirement are studied.

    The Labor Supply Effects of Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers (work in progress)

    Joint with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes F. Schmieder and Simon Trenkle

    Abstract: Extending Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits can affect labor supply along two margins: it can lengthen the unemployment duration of an individual who is entering UI and it can alter the inflows into UI . We study the total labor supply effects of UI for older workers using German Social Security data and policy variation over 3 decades. We present evidence of sharp bunchings in UI inflows at various age discontinuities created by UI eligibility for workers in their 50s, who may use UI as a pathway into early retirement. Using a combination of regression discontinuity designs and bunching techniques, we quantify the magnitude of these responses exploiting a variety of thresholds, kinks and notches induced by the UI and retirement institutions. Employing those moments, we estimate the total effect of UI extension for older workers using a a dynamic life-cycle structure model. Preliminary results suggest that a 6 month UI extension for men increases non-employment durations by 1.46 months, almost twice as large as the 0.84 months coming from intensive margin responses alone.

    Global Health Donors Viewed as Regulators of Monopolistic Service Providers: Lessons from Regulatory Literature​ (working paper)

    Abstract: Controlling healthcare costs while promoting maximum health impact in the recipient countries is one the biggest challenges for global health donors. This paper views global health donors as the regulators of monopolistic service providers, and explores potential optimal fund payment systems under asymmetric information. It provides a summary and assessment of the prevailing optimal price regulation designs for monopolistic service providers. A set of non-Bayesian approaches that are relevant and applicable for the global health donors are discussed. It also reviews incentive contracting experience between the public and private sectors.

    Full Paper (CGD working paper 424) Online Appendix       CGD final report: aligning incentives

    The Effect of Advance Notification: Evidence from WARN Act ( work in progress )

    Abstract: Mandatory advance notice of the impeding job loss in the event of plant closings and mass layoffs is one the government interventions to provide displaced workers separation protections. This paper evaluates the impact of advance notice on the employment prospects of the displaced workers using propensity-score matching method. The sample is obtained from the displaced worker supplement to the Current Population Surveys in the 1998 to 2008 decade. The estimation suggests workers received written notice two months before the layoffs are 5% less likely to become unemployment insurance (UI) claimants. However, advance notice has no significant effect on the UI exhaustion rate.

  • Teaching Assistant

    (EC551,EC501, EC356, EC325, EC371)

    Some reading materials for my students

    EC501 Intermediate Microeconomics (Masters level)

    EC551 Intermediate Labor Economics (Masters level)

    EC356 Labor Economics

    EC325 Poverty and Discrimination

    EC371 Environmental Economics

    Link to EC501 TA session slides (password needed)


    Casual Readings:

    The end of the population pyramid- The economists (Dec 20th, 2014) [population pyramid]


    In search of lost time: Why is everyone so busy?- The economists (Dec 20th, 2014) [value of leisure]


    Poverty and education -Michigan University

    The power and pitfall of Education incentives -Allan and Fryer 2011


    Particulate Matter Matters - by Dominici, Greenstone and Sunstein 2014 [pollution]


    General Equilibrium- by David H. Autor (MIT lecture note)


    Journal Articles:

    Behavioral Responses to Taxes: Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply- Eissa and Hoynes, 2006 [EITC]


  • Useful links


    Are you ready for the PhD program?

    Resources for Economics PhD Students -LSE

    Beautiful Mind- Albert Ma, BU - A must read for all PhD students in Economics!

    Getting a Ph.D. in Economics -Stuart J. Hillmon

    A guide for the young economist - William Thomson


    Write, write, write

    Silence your inner critic - The Serial Mentor



    15 minutes conference talk -The World Bank


    Where are the data sets?

    Data on China- Princeton

    Research Data Center of German Employment Agency



    Things to keep in mind when doing empirical works:

    Understanding ITT and TOT -Kevin Lang, BU


    How should we think of Behavioral Economics?

    Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective -Raj Chetty

    American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 2015


    Job Board:

    Behavioral Insights Jobs: A Jobs Board Run by The Behavioral Insights Group at Harvard

  • Boston University

    Department of Economics

    B07, 270 Bay State Road,

    Boston MA 02215