Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
I am a doctoral student in economics at Boston University. My fields of concentration are public policy, labor economics and applied microeconomics. I have explored the effect of advance notification on displaced workers' labor market outcomes under the setting of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. I have worked on a project about incentive-based adaptive regulation in healthcare financing in developing countries.
Currently, I am focusing on researching labor market behaviors of older workers in response to retirement policy reforms, in German context.
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, Boston University, September 2012 till now.
- Field of Interest: Labor Economics, Public Policy, Applied Microeconomics
M.A. Economics, Boston University, 2012
B.A. Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 2007
Funding for a Research Assistant, RA Mentor Program, Boston University, Spring 2015
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, Summer 2014
Research Assistant, Boston University, Spring, Summer 2011
More things she is working on...
The Labor Supply Effects of Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers (work in progress)
Joint with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes F. Schmieder and Simon Trenkle
Abstract: Extending Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits can affect labor supply along two margins: it can lengthen the unemployment duration of an individual who is entering UI – the intensive margin – and it can alter the inflows into UI – the extensive margin. We study
the labor supply effects of UI for older workers using German Social Security data and policy
variation over 3 decades. We present evidence of extensive margin responses in the form of
sharp bunching in UI inflows at various age discontinuities in UI eligibility for workers in their 50s, who may use UI as a pathway into early retirement. Using a combination of regression
discontinuity designs and bunching techniques we quantify the magnitude of these responses
exploiting a variety of thresholds, kinks and notches induced by the UI and retirement institutions. To provide estimates of the combined effects of UI extensions on time out of work through extensive and intensive margin responses, we use two approaches. First we employ a simple model based on two types that uses a static retirement model to model extensive
margin responses. While this is very intuitive it has various shortcomings, in particular the
types are unlikely to be well differentiated in practice and hard to identify. Our second approach therefore estimates a dynamic life-cycle model of labor supply where individuals face
retirement and search intensity decisions. Preliminary results suggest that a 6 month UI extension for men increases non-employment durations by 1.46 months, almost twice as large as the 0.84 months coming from intensive margin responses alone.
Global Health Donors Viewed as Regulators of Monopolistic Service Providers: Lessons from Regulatory Literature
Controlling healthcare costs while promoting maximum health impact in the recipient countries is one the biggest challenges for global health donors. This paper views global health donors as the regulators of monopolistic service providers, and explores potential optimal fund payment systems under asymmetric information. It provides a summary and assessment of the prevailing optimal price regulation designs for monopolistic service providers. A set of non-Bayesian approaches that are relevant and applicable for the global health donors are discussed. It also reviews incentive contracting experience between the public and private sectors.
Full Paper (CGD working paper 424)
The effect of advance notification: evidence from WARN act
Mandatory advance notice of the impeding job loss in the event of plant closings and mass layoffs is one the government interventions to provide displaced workers separation protections. This paper evaluates the impact of advance notice on the employment prospects of the displaced workers using propensity-score matching method. The sample is obtained from the displaced worker supplement to the Current Population Surveys in the 1998 to 2008 decade. The estimation suggests workers received written notice two months before the layoffs are 5% less likely to become unemployment insurance (UI) claimants. However, advance notice has no significant effect on the UI exhaustion rate. The results are robust to sensitivity analysis of the conditional Independence assumption when the selection is negative. However, a modest positive selection into advance notice assignment halves the estimated ATT on reducing unemployment incidence.
Link to full paper upon request
(EC501,EC356, EC325, EC371)
Some reading materials for students who take EC356, EC325, and EC371.
EC501 Intermediate Microeconomics (Master level)
EC356, EC325 Labor Economics, Poverty and Discrimination
EC371 Environmental Economics
The end of the population pyramid- The economists (Dec 20th, 2014) [population pyramid]
In search of lost time: Why is everyone so busy?- The economists (Dec 20th, 2014) [value of leisure]
Poverty and education -Michigan University
The power and pitfall of Education incentives -Allan and Fryer 2011
Particulate Matter Matters - by Dominici, Greenstone and Sunstein 2014 [pollution]
General Equilibrium- by David H. Autor (MIT lecture note)
Are you ready for the PhD program?
Beautiful Mind- Albert Ma, BU - A must read for all PhD students in Economics!
Getting a Ph.D. in Economics -Stuart J. Hillmon
A guide for the young economist - William Thomson
Where are the data sets?
Data on China- Princeton
Things to keep in mind when doing empirical works:
Understanding ITT and TOT -Kevin Lang, BU
How should we think of Behavioral Economics?
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 2015
Behavioral Insights Jobs: A Jobs Board Run by The Behavioral Insights Group at Harvard
How to be take notes?
An interesting article from Quaro: